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	ABSTRACT: Since its inception in the eighteenth century, the discipline of the history of science has served a motley collection of extrinsic disciplinary interests, philosophical ideas, and cultural movements. This paper examines the historiographical implications of modernism and postmodernism and shows how they influenced positivist, postpositivist, and sociological interpretations of the Chemical Revolution. It also shows how these interpretations served the disciplinary interests of science, philosophy, and sociology, respectively, and it points toward a model of the history of science as history.

		
	Since its inception in the eighteenth century, the discipline of the history of science has occupied a contested intellectual terrain, shaped by philosophical and ideological forces associated with the development and cultural entanglements of science itself. Reflecting on the appropriation of the history of science by religious, scientific, philosophical, and sociological ideologies and interests, I. B. Cohen wondered just what to make of the “many faces of the history of science.” Should it be seen as a “font of examples for philosophers, a scientific type of history, an archaeology of discovery, a branch of sociology, a variant of intellectual history – or what?”​[1]​ This essay will explore some of the existing philosophical and cultural features of the discipline of the history of science and indicate some of the ways it falls short of an adequate historiography.	
	
	I have argued elsewhere that, during the second half of the twentieth century, the historiography of the Chemical Revolution passed through three distinct historiographical stages, each characterized by a dominant interpretive strategy or style.​[2]​ The first phase was shaped by positivist and Whig notions of science as a teleologically structured body of experimental knowledge. The “postpositivist” identification of science with global and autonomous theorizing challenged and replaced this perspective in the 1960s and 1970s, but it gave way in the 1980s and 1990s to the sociological view of science as a form of practice shaped by the contingent constraints of specific agents acting in local contexts. Having dealt extensively with the first two stages of this interpretive triad elsewhere, I will concentrate in this essay on their relation to philosophical themes associated with the wider cultural movement of modernism, and I will show how the transition from modernism to postmodernism shaped the third, sociological mode of interpretation.​[3]​ Since the relation between the sequence of interpretive styles and strategies and the individual texts and authors they informed is highly mediated, I will focus here on the general features of interpretive paradigms, referring the reader to existing and forthcoming studies for more detailed accounts of the fit between paradigms and practitioners. 
	
1. MODERNISM AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE
	Positivism

	Positivist accounts of the history of science embodied philosophical principles and assumptions associated with essentialism, historicism, and idealism.​[4]​ These assumptions grounded knowledge in the nature of things, posited an inherent logic of history, and upheld the identity, or correspondence, of thought and things. The assumption of an identity between the knowing subject and the known object informed the positivist distinction between states of cognitive transparency, such as truth, knowledge, illumination, objectivity, and rationality, enjoyed by the “children of light,” and states of cognitive opacity, such as error, ignorance, prejudice, superstition, and darkness, in which reality was occluded or distorted by the unreceptive minds of the “children of darkness.” The dialectic between cognitive transparency and opacity played a central role in positivist accounts of the history of science and the demarcation between science and nonscience. Emphasizing the demarcation and “consensual” unity of science, positivist historians argued that once astronomy and physics broke with prescientific modes of thought in the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, scientists merely had to deploy the unique scientific method to ensure cognitive progress in the other disciplines of science. Positivist historians saw in the history of science a clear reflection of the unique rationality of science and its progressive, Manichean struggle with the forces of darkness and irrationality.
	
	The principle of expressive causality, according to which nature, society, and the mind are the visible manifestations, or expressions, of an invisible cause, essence, or center of things, shaped the general positivist belief in an unfolding logic, or telos, of history. Positivists reduced the specificity of an historical event to that of a mere moment in a dynamic totality, unfolding according to the dictates of a predetermined end. The unfolding essence, or subject, of history imparted continuity to historical development and homogeneity to the developing parts, so that no one aspect could outstrip or lag behind any of the other aspects of a society. Emphasizing the cognitive efficacy of individual agents and the eureka-moment notion of discovery, positivist historians emphasized problems of chronology, priority, and authorship as integral parts of the historicist problematic of periodization, with its concern to delineate carefully and precisely the different stages in the unfolding of past science towards present science.
	




	Postpositivist philosophers of science, including Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, and Thomas Kuhn, challenged the empiricist sensibilities of positivism with a theoreticist conception of the nature of science and its historical development.​[5]​ Rejecting the epistemological distinction between observation statements, grounded in experience, and theoretical statements, based on conjecture, postpositivists identified knowledge with theory. Emphasizing global rather than local theories, they replaced the positivist view of the epistemological efficacy of individual subjects and their originary moments of discovery with the theoreticist notion of “epistemology without a knowing subject” and the structuralist idea of history as a “process without a subject.” Theoreticism rendered unintelligible the essentialist view of knowledge as inscribed in the nature of things and the historicist notion of a logic, or telos, of history. In place of the positivist vision of the unity, linearity, and homogeneity of a single, absolute historical time, postpositivism advanced the idea of a succession of distinct epochal times, each with its own unity, linearity, and homogeneity. The resulting historicized models of science replaced the formalist view of scientific theories as static sets of abstract propositions – championed by the Logical Positivists - with a more dynamic emphasis on the role of “guiding assumptions” in the formation and development of scientific theorizing. But the emphasis these models placed on the conceptual unity and structure of scientific doctrines discouraged the formation of an adequate sense of the specific historical context and sequential development of scientific thought. 
	




	Connecting positivism and postpositivism to modernism is not without its difficulties. The literature on modernism and postmodernism is vast and varied, but despite the obvious centrality of science and its interpretation for “the narrative construction of ‘modernity,’” little scholarly attention has been paid to the significance of the history and philosophy of science for an understanding of modernism and postmodernism.​[6]​ Connections are also obscured by the complexities and ambiguities associated with the vocabulary of modernism and postmodernism, which acquires different connotations from the perspective of art, architecture, science, social theory, history, and philosophy. Thus, while some commentators focus on the “high modernism” that flourished in art and literature between the World Wars, others use the terminology of modernism to characterize the upheavals that took place in philosophy and culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There is also disagreement over the meaning of “modernism”; while some scholars equate it with the “Enlightenment promotion of rationality and freedom,” others relate it to the less-confident hope for aesthetic redemption or ironic affirmation of modern life associated with Nietzsche.​[7]​ Similarly, while some commentators view postmodernism as a disguised, degenerate, and ephemeral version of modernism, serving conservative political functions, others view it as an epochal break with the modern world.​[8]​ It is impossible here to do justice to the complexities and ambiguities associated with modernism and postmodernism, and no attempt will be made to discuss the dynamic “aporias” that impelled them. With an eye on the development of the philosophy and sociology of science over the last two hundred years, the term “modernism” will be used in this essay to identify and characterize the philosophical and cultural sensibilities ushered in by the socioeconomic transition from feudalism to capitalism and usually associated with the principles and practices of the Enlightenment. The term “postmodernism” will be used to characterize the challenge to the philosophical sensibilities of modernism associated with the rise of poststructuralism and the “failed revolt” of May 1968 in Paris.​[9]​ A full appreciation of the cognitive force, cultural significance, and historiographical implications of modernism requires a consideration of its emergence from the premodern world.

	If, as Frederic Jameson argued, postmodernism is “the cultural logic of late capitalism,” then modernism may be regarded as the cultural matrix of earlier, commercial and industrial, capitalism.​[10]​ The emergence of capitalism involved a “long drawn-out transition from feudalism,” in which the modern institutions and cultures of individuality and autonomy replaced the premodern world of communal integration and the unity of being.​[11]​ In feudalism, the economic, social, political, and personal realms of life were integrated parts of a hierarchical unity, in which the individual was constituted by a web of relations to nature, society, and God. In the feudal estate, the personal and social identities of the individual were inseparable, and the economic activity of the production and distribution of wealth embodied the hierarchical social relations of the system, which were simultaneously political and personal. With the rise of capitalism, this system of mutually constitutive parts gave way to a society based on clear-cut distinctions between the economic, social, and political realms.​[12]​ The interconnected world of feudalism disintegrated and its parts were reorganized into formally contained realms of distinct activities, including science, religion, art, politics, and economics. The organic unity of nature, society, and the self in feudalism gave way to a mechanistic conjunction of autonomous realms, in which each of these elements were independently constituted by internal principles of identity and regulation. 

	The cognitive and cultural counterpart to this socioeconomic process of simultaneous dissolution and autonomization involved the seventeenth-century split between rational man and mechanical nature, scientific explanation and hermeneutical understanding, as well as the emergence of the Enlightenment notion of the self-defining subject.​[13]​ Self-assertion and self-definition were the guiding principles of modernity, accounting for its focus on the present and its superiority to the past.​[14]​ Medieval and early-Renaissance thought defined the self in relation to the cosmic order and equated reason with the eternal verities held in common by the human and the divine mind. The real task of knowledge on this view was the construction of metaphysical systems based on intrinsic, a priori links between man, nature, and society. The Enlightenment mind rejected the idea of an intrinsic link between the self and the cosmos: the knowing mind encounters the world as a set of de facto contingent correlations.​[15]​ Thus, Kant criticized eighteenth-century empiricist and rationalist philosophers for their lingering appeal to empirical and metaphysical foundations for knowledge; he developed his transcendental philosophy as a “way of demonstrating the autonomy, the self-grounding authority of modern thought and therewith modern culture.”​[16]​ The desire to purge Kant’s “critical” philosophy of its own dogmatic residues shaped the philosophical contours of nineteenth-century German Idealism, which culminated in Hegel’s notion of “self-positing spirit.” While Enlightenment thinkers from Descartes to Kant identified modernity with the principle of subjectivity, an all-consuming activity of self-knowledge, self-discovery, and self-production, Hegel’s doctrine of “absolute spirit” moved beyond the level of isolated subjects to an autonomous domain of objective reason.​[17]​ In a similar vein, Max Weber identified the spirit of modernity with the differentiation of the traditional unified worldview of religion and metaphysics into the autonomous cultural- and value-spheres of science (truth), morality (normativity), and art (taste), a process that Jurgen Habermas sought to complete in the twentieth century, when he insisted upon the irreducibility of “the objective, subjective, and the intersubjective dimensions of rationality.”​[18]​ The same logic of purification and autonomization fostered twentieth-century aesthetic modernism, which called for “the differentiation of the purely aesthetic from other realms of human endeavor, such as ethics, politics, religion, or economics.”​[19]​ As Habermas noted, modernism consisted in “the relentless development of the objectivating sciences, of the universalistic foundations of morality and law, and of autonomous art, all in accord with their own immanent logic.”​[20]​ Sundering the unified cosmos of the premoderns into distinct spheres of cognition and action, defined, validated, and regulated by their own inner logics, modernism populated reality with an array of distinctions and dualisms, such as those between subject and object, society and nature, human and nonhuman, reality and language, knowledge and faith, and science and nonscience. The secularized world of modernism made the autonomous individual the subject of knowledge, the source of values, the possessor of rights, and the focus of utility ​[21]​. 
	
	The modernist philosophy of autonomy involved an analytical conception of formal reason, a representational theory of thought and language, and a secular and progressivist view of history. These accounts of reason, language, and history shaped the development of positivist and postpositivist philosophies of science and provided the critical foil for the emergence of postmodernist sensibilities associated with the sociology of scientific knowledge. The transition from feudal unity and integration to capitalist autonomy and differentiation gave modernism its critical, normative and formal orientation. Starting with the attack on scholasticism, religious authority, and feudal power, modernism upheld the self-sufficiency of reason and grounded knowledge in rational processes independent of accepted tradition, dogma, or authority and oriented to 
the instrumental service of humanity. Bereft of specific metaphysical and empirical content, modernist reason was formal and procedural, concerned with abstract forms of knowledge and methods of inquiry.​[22]​ The emergence of a sense of epistemological autonomy also coincided with a shift in the activity of the knowing mind, in which the associative and analogical understanding of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance gave way to analytic reason. Instead of “drawing things together” in a web of resemblances, the modern mind discriminated between things by “establishing their identities” and, thereby, their “differences” from other things.​[23]​ Although modernism extended the boundaries of new identities, it viewed the forms of identity as circumscribed and fixed, positing “centered” subjects or closed structures, compelled by inner norms or principles.​[24]​ The logic of identity and difference buttressed the modernist notion of autonomous spheres of thought and action, operating according to their own inner logics and within strict disciplinary limits and institutional boundaries.​[25]​ These analytical and formal sensibilities shaped the positivist and postpositivist accounts of the unity, autonomy, and internal development of science.
	
	Rejecting traditional sources of legitimation and justification, modernism had “to create its own normativity out of itself.”​[26]​ But autonomy threatened heteronomy, as modernism sought to impose its self-generated principles and values on the refractory world around it. Propounding universal principles, rather than local traditions and arbitrary conventions, the autonomous spheres of modernism did not “simply coexist uncompetitively.” Criticism and denunciation were the order of the day. The modernist urge to extend the boundaries and stretch the limits of rationality generated “an endless series of reductionist and antireductionist moves,” in which the reductionists tried “to make everything scientific, or political (Lenin), or aesthetic (Baudelaire, Nietzsche)” and the antireductionists showed what such attempts left out.​[27]​ In this competitive, expansionist cauldron, modernism generated “logocentric, transcendental totalizing meta-narratives that anticipated all questions and provided predetermined answers.”​[28]​ The resulting reductionist models of scientific knowledge, shared by positivists and postpositivists alike, emphasized the unity of its theoretical structure, the universality of its concepts and methods, and the necessity of its instantiations. The modernist problematic of legitimation also issued in the famous distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, which positivist and postpositivist scholars used to distinguish the historians task of describing how scientific discoveries were, in fact, made from the more important job of the philosopher, who developed abstract models of knowledge for “the criticism as well as the reform of what exists.”​[29]​ 
	Modernist dualisms of subject and object, mind and body, inner and outer assimilated knowledge and language to the category of “representation.” Upholding Descartes’ view of the dualism of mind and body and Locke’s concept of knowledge as a “mental process,” modernism replaced the premodern “hylomorphic conception of knowledge,” which involved “the subject’s becoming identical with the object,” with the concept of knowledge as the possession by the mind of “accurate representations of an object.” While ancient and medieval thought had only a tenuous hold on the distinction between inner “mental states” and the “external world,” seventeenth-century philosophers took it seriously enough “to pose the problem of the veil of ideas,” the problem that made epistemology central to modern philosophy.​[30]​ As nature became an “object,” human beings became “subjects,” the source of all truth and meaning.​[31]​ The problematic of representation is also evident in the change in linguistic sensibilities that accompanied the transition from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme. For philosophers of the Renaissance, language resided in the world as a system of signs enmeshed in the resemblances and similitude of things. The Classical episteme, which provided the underpinnings for the Enlightenment mind, severed this intimate link between words and things. The interpretation of the language of nature gave way to the representation of nature in the language of men.​[32]​ Modernism dissolved the premodern “fusion of semantic and causal relations,” which ascribed to names the ability “to possess the power of things to which they refer.”​[33]​ By separating the causal from the rational, the descriptive from the normative, modernism tied rationality to referentiality, viewing justification, or legitimation, as a referential relation between ideas, or statements, and the world they seek to represent. In this manner, modernism bequeathed to positivist and postpositivist philosophers of science the problematic of realism. 
	
	Modernism’s self-legitimating break with the past made time an integral component of reality and produced a tensile sense of history as simultaneously revolutionary and teleological. Looking forward to a future that would shatter the past, modernists maintained that events “took place not only in history but through history.”​[34]​ Inherently dynamic and revolutionary, modernism conquered space with time, making it “a locus through which to get from A to B, rather than a place to live in.”​[35]​ Valorizing the novelty of the future, modernism interpreted the passage of time not as a cycle, decadence, or a falling, but as an abolition of the past. Modernists saw themselves as separated from the past not by “a certain number of centuries,” but by revolutions, breaks, and ruptures “so radical that nothing of the past survived in them.”​[36]​ The modernist identity was inextricably linked to the notion of time as the sure arrow of progress that separated them from the premoderns. But the modernist sense of future novelty collided with the logocentric requirements of self-legitimation and produced “teleological narratives” of progressive emergence and justification, according to which history unfolds in “homogeneous, empty time.” The resulting historiography of the victors celebrated a single revolutionary break with the past, which required no more revolutions “to fulfill the promise of the new.”​[37]​ The historicist notion of the unity and homogeneity of modern time shaped the positivist historiography of science and influenced in a more ambiguous way the historical sensibilities of postpositivism.


Modernism and the Philosophy of Science
	
	Philosophical modernism provided a dynamic template for the development of positivist and postpositivist philosophies and historiographies of science. Notwithstanding their considerable semantic, epistemological, and methodological differences, positivist and postpositivist philosophers of science used modernist narratives of legitimation to link scientific practices and results to rationality, progress, or truth.​[38]​ Positivists and postpositivists formulated “grand narratives” of the hierarchical unity of the different cognitive levels – observation, theory, method, and instrumentation - of science grounded in general theories of meaning, knowledge, and language. More specifically, the modernist philosophy of autonomy and separation shaped the positivist view of the unity of science and the demarcation of science from nonscience. Modernism’s self-legitimating search for universal principles linked the unity of science to the deployment of a single, universal method, language, or theoretical structure, grounded in a shared domain of unitary experience. Viewing metaphysics as the successor of theology, positivism demarcated between science and metaphysics in a way that emphasized the practical usefulness of the former and the scholastic uselessness of the latter. The positivist preoccupation with the unity and demarcation of science further harmonized with the modernist vision of the formation of autonomous spheres of thought and action developing within strict disciplinary boundaries, according to their own inner logics. But there was a tension in the narrative of modernity between the celebration of “the epistemic autonomy of increasingly specialized domains of knowledge … and their unification by formal procedures of reasoning and justification.” While the positivists “subordinated the claims of disciplinary autonomy within the sciences to formal method and the unity of science,” the postpositivists emphasized “the autonomy of disciplines and research programs within disciplines.”​[39]​ Theoreticism substituted the autonomy of reason for the autonomy of the subject. While positivists and postpositivists alike upheld the arationality assumption, which emphasized the social autonomy of reason by restricting the sociology of knowledge to the explanation of beliefs that could not be explained in terms of their rational merits, theoreticism also maintained an absolute distinction between thought and reality, thereby rendering unintelligible positivist attempts to ground thought in experience, or language in the world. But the postpositivist turn against the formal unity of science was incomplete. Although the historical school of postpositivists rejected the abstract, formal, static models of explanation and justification developed by the Logical Positivists, they still distinguished between the abstract, generalisable content of theories and their specific historical contexts. They also envisioned universal structures, or patterns, for the internal development of science, as is evident in Kuhn’s “timeless cycle of epochs: normal science, crisis science, revolutionary science, and the return to normal science.”​[40]​ If the positivist doctrines of empirical certainty and eureka discoveries in science represented classical modernism’s attempt to ground knowledge in the “self-certainty of subjectivity,” then postpositivism’s notion of “knowledge without a knowing subject” marks “late” modernism’s fallibilistic construal of the rationality, universality, and autonomy of scientific thought and action.​[41]​
	
	Epistemological and semantic differences between positivism’s vision of a unitary experience for science and postpositivism’s insistence on theoretical pluralism in science surfaced in their divergent articulations of the modernist problematic of realism. While the “naïve realism” of positivism restricted the ontological and epistemological significance of science to its observational terms and statements, the main thrust of postpositivism was in the direction of “critical realism,” which anchored the ontology and epistemology of science to its theoretical terms and principles. The antirealist themes of instrumentalism – associated with a minority of positivists – and idealism – in Kuhn’s writings, for example – should be viewed as minor deviations from the modernist problematic of realism. While instrumentalism reiterated premodern concerns with “saving the phenomena,” idealism prefigured postmodernist themes associated with sociological constructivism. 	The modernist problematic of truth and reference issued in an array of “depth models,” such as those of essence and appearance, latent and manifest, signifier and signified, self and other, which were the ineluctable targets of postmodernist deconstructions predicated on the claim that “there is no reality which is not itself already image, spectacle, simulacrum, gratuitous fiction.”​[42]​

	Modernism’s valorization of time as simultaneously revolutionary and teleological shaped the positivist view of a single Scientific Revolution, followed by the synchronized, homogeneous, and continuous development of the different disciplines of science along the same line of historical progress. Registering classical modernism’s attempt to ground knowledge in the “self-certainty of subjectivity,” the positivist historiography of science located the motive force of this development in the eureka-discoveries, crucial experiments, and creative insights of individual men of genius at one with nature. Although the postpositivist doctrine of “knowledge without a knowing subject” replaced the positivist vision of the unity, linearity, and homogeneity of a single, absolute historical time with the idea of a succession of distinct epochal times, each with its own unity, linearity, and homogeneity, it still upheld modernism’s valorization of time, emphasizing the growth of knowledge, the link between rationality and progress, and the developmental nature of paradigms, programs, and traditions. As Feuerbach said of Hegel, positivist and postpositivist alike focused on “exclusive time,” rather than “tolerant space,” recognizing “only subordination and succession,” the “monarchical” subsumption of the past under the aegis of the present.​[43]​ Replacing modernist metaphors of temporal progress with postmodernist images of spatial dispersion, sociologists of scientific knowledge called for more contextualized accounts of the places of the production and proliferation of scientific knowledge. 

	POSTMODERNISM AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE
Naturalism and the Sociology of Knowledge
	Opposition to postpositivism soon emerged among sociologists of scientific knowledge and sociologically inclined historians of science, who replaced idealist notions of the unity and autonomy of scientific thought with an awareness of the particularity and materiality of scientific practices. In 1982, John Christie and Jan Golinski proposed a new historiography for seventeenth- and eighteenth-century chemistry, in which they criticized "the old internalism" because it identified science with "the processes and products of the intellect" and emphasized "the influence thereon of activities such as speculative natural philosophy, matter-theory, epistemology, methodology, and natural theology." Highlighting "the problematic nature of the relationship between such factors and the practice of chemistry," they sought "to investigate the conditions of perpetuation of chemical practice and discourse." Focusing on chemistry as a "historical practice," they argued that factors falling on both sides of the divide between "the old internal/external dichotomy" constituted eighteenth-century chemistry as a "didactic discipline."​[44]​ The burgeoning program of the sociology of scientific knowledge shaped Christie and Golinski’s new historiographical proposal, which replaced normative distinctions between internal and external, rational and arational, beliefs with causal accounts of the social origins of all beliefs, rational and arational, scientific and nonscientific. These developments had a profound influence on the discipline of the history of science, generating numerous studies that denigrated positivism, rejected “philosophical appropriations of history,” and articulated contextualist models of the relation between science and society. 
	
	Practitioners of the sociology of scientific knowledge rejected the normative distinction between internal, rational beliefs and external, arational beliefs in the name of “naturalism,” which explained the formation of scientific beliefs without assessing their epistemic significance, or validity. According to the Strong Programme, developed by David Bloor, a scientifically adequate sociology of scientific knowledge should focus on the social causes of scientific beliefs, and posit the same kinds of causes for all beliefs – including those of the sociologists of knowledge – whatever their epistemic status. Philosophers of science were quick to criticize the Strong Programme, arguing that the claim that “all beliefs are socially caused, rather than well-founded,” implies that the beliefs of the sociologist of scientific knowledge “have no relevant rational credentials and hence no special claims to acceptability.”​[45]​ Pressing their point, philosophers of science concerned with the rationality of science treated all sociologists of knowledge as “constructivists,” accusing them of reducing science to a cultural artifact, with no cognitive relation to, or input from, the external world. 





	In his seminal study The Postmodern Condition, Jean-Francois Lyotard defined “postmodern as incredulity toward [the] metanarratives” of modernism, which deployed such “grand narratives” as the dialectic of Spirit, the emancipation of humanity, and the progress of science to unify and legitimate the separate sciences and their separate practices. Loosening the all-embracing grip of philosophy’s grand narratives, postmodernism identified science as a particular “language game,” incapable of legitimating, or being legitimated by, any other language game. Lyotard insisted that the autonomous disciplines of science are the sole sources of their own limited, local, and provisional forms of legitimation.​[48]​ Postmodernism projected an image of science that was radically different from those developed by positivism and postpositivism. Fundamentally opposed to essentialism, historicism, realism, and the associated problematic of reference and rationality, this image conveyed a sense of “the fragmentary, heterogeneous, and plural character” of thought, language, reality, and the self.​[49]​ Encouraging pluralism, relativism, and antirealism in the philosophy of science, postmodernism – reflexively attuned to its postmodern identity – encompassed a plurality of philosophical arguments and strategies to uphold a nominalalist image of science and its fragmented historical identity. Postmodernism was “a time of nominalism in a variety of senses (from culture to philosophical thought.)”​[50]​

	Postmodernism as a coherent philosophical and cultural movement emerged in the cultural revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s, though it reached maturity only in the reactionary atmosphere of Reagan-era economics and Cold War strategy. Birthed by the frustrated revolutionary aspirations of French left-wing intellectuals in 1968, postmodernism framed the liberation struggles of gender and racial minorities in Europe and North America in the 1970s and early 1980s, only to be coopted in the 1980s by the interests of a resurgent cultural and political establishment in Britain and the United States. Postmodernism was intensely political, and the divergent political contexts in which it flourished issued in significant variations in its nominalist premises and naturalist strategies.​[51]​ In its revolutionary and oppositional formulation, associated with French poststructuralism and feminism, the incredulity towards metanarratives expressed the desire to escape from all totalizing systems of thought and action and the association of order and autonomy with configurations of violence inherent in the will to power. Giving shape to the reactionary mode of postmodernism, which valued “consensus and community,” rather than escape and revolution, Richard Rorty responded to “avant-garde” escapism with an antinormative emphasis on the “brute contingencies that unite us all” and the defense of a program of social engineering “in which society as a whole asserts itself without bothering to ground itself.”​[52]​ Thus,  the postmodernist movement split into two broad countervailing currents of thought, one emanating from Continental philosophy and associated with a skeptical view of knowledge and the slogan “anything goes,” and the other, more “indigenous to Anglo-North American culture,” prepared to affirm one set of beliefs over another, but in a fallible, tentative, and relativistic manner.​[53]​ While sociological naturalism eschewed epistemological evaluation of any sort, its antinormative orientation was closer to the affirmative relativization of knowledge to context and circumstances than to the skeptical obliteration of knowledge entirely. Nevertheless, many of the analytical categories – concerning the nature of science and its relation to society – deployed by sociological naturalists came from the skeptical cauldron of Continental philosophy. The mingling of the previously distinct traditions of analytical Anglo-American philosophy and speculative Continental philosophy is a characteristic feature of postmodernist sociology of scientific knowledge. 
	
	Although postmodernism slipped its early political moorings, drifting from leftist opposition to centrist and conservative support for the political establishment, its initial oppositional formation left a lasting impression on the basic contours of its philosophical sensibilities and orientation. Postmodernism’s original break with the modernist problematic of legitimation occurred with the perception of French left-wing intellectuals, such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard, that the French Communist Party refused to live up to its revolutionary ideals when it failed to support the student revolution in Paris in May 1968.​[54]​ Viewing the “official left”
 as a “double and pseudo-rival of the Gaullist regime,” these thinkers concluded that trying to replace one system with another system would end up with a system that resembled the one that was replaced.​[55]​ Rejecting both the Gaullist state and its Communist pseudo-rival, the “disillusioned children of 1968” refused to have anything to do with the totalizing logics of capitalism, communism, or any of the other metanarratives of modernism. Turning their back on class struggle and the global patterns of legitimation associated with it, they looked elsewhere, in the struggles of local communities and minorities, for the revolutionary spirit of 1968. But they used these local struggles and the ideas they spawned not to overthrow modernism and replace it with a new system, but to rethink or reform it from the inside, to “deconstruct” or go beyond it, to struggle “against and within it.”​[56]​ Deconstructing the modernist problematic of legitimation, postmodernism involved “an inverted millenarianism,” in which “premonitions of the future, catastrophic or redemptive, have been replaced by senses of the end of this or that (the end of ideology, art, or social class,)” and of course, “the end of history.”​[57]​
	
	Postmodernists linked the predilection for totalizing and systematizing thought and practice to the “rational demands for unity, purity, universality, and ultimacy” inherent in the modernist problematic of autonomy and legitimation.​[58]​ Postmodernists rejected modernism’s privileging of reason (over emotions) because of the dominating, oppressive, and totalitarian consequences of its claim to universalism. They opposed the modernist idea of a unique and determining scientific method, and the associated program for unification and the reconciliation of opposing viewpoints, with the idea of a multiplicity of conflicting scenarios and outlooks.  While “skeptical” postmodernists replaced the global order of modernism with a sense of the fragmentation, disintegration, and meaninglessness of life, in which the absence of truth left only play, farce, parody, or pleasure, “affirmative” postmodernists adopted more localized, less dogmatic modes of legitimation, contextually ranking values and building domain-specific models of rationality.​[59]​ In this manner, postmodernism called for the “deconstruction” of the rational distinctions between true and false, subject and object, knowledge and power, reality and appearance, past and present, and “all the other modernist dichotomies.”​[60]​ Thus, postmodernism replaced the modernist notion of the self-defining, autonomous subject, and the associated idea of pre-existent essences and structures determining individual events and actions, with a view of the role of local agents and specific practices in the temporary formation of fleeting meanings, values, and knowledge-claims. Questioning the “generally accepted relation between author, text, and reader,” postmodernists rejected the associated ideas of authorial intent and  objective textual content, and emphasized the power of the reader “to define and create textual meaning.”​[61]​  The relativization of truth and meaning to contexts and circumstances involved replacing representational and realist models of language and thought with antirealist views of a language-laden reality and relativist doctrines of the role of rhetoric and persuasion in the constitution of scientific knowledge. Detaching science from the representational function and universalizing aspirations of theory, postmodernism pointed to the role of concrete practices and implicit skills in the construction of local and regional forms of knowledge. Replacing unity with diversity, totalization with fragmentation, and autonomy with dependence, postmodernism insisted that, embedded in local contexts of control and domination, science is neither value-free nor necessarily progressive. 
	




The sociology of scientific knowledge

	Sociologists of scientific knowledge used a variety of postmodernist philosophical strategies to break with idealism, essentialism, and historicism, and to develop a disciplinary identity fractured by the philosophical tensions between modernism and postmodernism. Rejecting “the idealist tendency to refer directly to concepts as ‘scientific,’ ‘symbolic,’ ‘ideological,’ and so on,” sociologists of scientific knowledge insisted that the conflict between ideas is really a confrontation between the people who hold them.​[65]​ While the Edinburgh School replaced theoreticism with materialist accounts of the causal role of local, social interests in the development of knowledge, ethnomethodologists focused on the situated practices of individual agents in particular contexts, and constructivists like Bruno Latour developed the voluntarist thesis that science is the rhetorical mobilization of allies who have lost the will for further dissent.​[66]​ Denying that abstract theories and formal methods have inherent significance, sociologists of scientific knowledge treated them as instruments in the material, rhetorical, and political struggles of individual scientists operating in local communities.

	The Edinburgh School classified theoreticism as a species of essentialism, which
treats scientific objects, such as electrons, protons, and neutrons, as “essentially identical
entities,” with essential properties “manifested identically” in every particle.​[67]​ On this
view, concepts and theories acquire inherent meaning and rules of usage, which
determine their future use and application, by picking out and characterizing specific 
kinds of objects and their essential properties. Denying the reality of universals and the 
efficacy of rules, the Edinburgh School adopted a Wittgensteinian form of nominalism,
which based the use of words and the meaning of concepts on the “resemblances,” rather
than the identical features, of individual things, and left their future use and application 
open-ended and uncertain. Postmodernist developments in the Continental philosophies 
of structuralism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics reinforced and further articulated 
these nominalist tendencies, as can be seen in the deconstructionist themes associated with poststructuralism, ethnomethodology, and reception theory. These developments 
replaced any notion of predetermined meaning or truth, whether in the form of
synchronic structures, transcendental egos, totalizing texts, authorial intentions, or 
interpretive traditions, with the dispersed and chaotic collection of the material and
discursive practices of individual agents in local contexts.​[68]​ While the Edinburgh School
 and the Bath relativists used nominlist arguments to relativize scientific knowledge
 to social circumstances, “constructivists” and ethnomethodologists, like Latour, Woolgar, and Knorr-Cetina, deployed them to defend antirealist theories of meaning, which denied the existence of extra-discursive objects and maintained that the “facts” of science are “social constructs.”​[69]​ When practitioners of science studies replaced representational models of science-as-knowledge with constructivist models of science-as-practice, they embraced “a trademark of ‘postmodern’ thought,” which questioned  the  distinction between subject and object inherent in the realist-antirealist debate.​[70]​
	Sociologists of scientific knowledge distanced themselves from any historicist
notion of a logic, or intrinsic dynamic, of history. They questioned the postpositivist view 
of the determining role of “guiding assumptions,” or “global theories,” in the
development of science by appealing to Wittgensteinian and poststructuralist notions of 
the underdetermination of actions by rules; Kuhnian ideas of the role of concrete exemplars and tacit knowledge in the development of science; ethnomethodological views of the cognitive efficacy of individual agents and situated logics; Foucauldian concerns with the microphysics of the knowledge-power nexus; and deconstructionist assaults on the totalizing texts of structuralism. They opposed theoreticism with nominalist arguments against the generalizing function of theories and for a “tinkering” view of experiments and the constitutive role of scientific instruments in the production of facts.​[71]​ Denying any intrinsic relation between different kinds of social interests and different kinds of knowledge, the Edinburgh School defended the “social use” model of science, according to which connections between science and society are “historically contingent” outcomes of how local agents use available cognitive resources to further their social interests.​[72]​ Viewing science as a social construct, sociologists of scientific knowledge shifted the locus of science from the contexts of the discovery and justification of scientific theories and facts to the context of their dissemination and reception in the scientific community. They located the core of science in its texts, instruments, and institutions, which they viewed not as means for the communication and transmission of prior knowledge, but as discursive devices involved in the simultaneous formation of knowledge and the community of knowers.​[73]​ These philosophical arguments and strategies issued  in a finitistic view of knowledge, according to which the application of concepts is a matter of innovative judgment at the local level, which is not determined by theoretical principles, linguistic rules, past usage, or social interests. 

	The intermingling of modernist and postmodernist themes in the sociology of scientific knowledge produced discordant images of the nature of society and its relation to science.​[74]​ Adopting the modernist distinction between subject and object, society and nature, and the associated representational model of science-as-knowledge, the Edinburgh School used the “ostensive” model of society to explain agents’ theoretical beliefs about the world in terms of their preexisting social interests.​[75]​ Rejecting the modernist problematic, a range of theorists, including Latour, Pinch, and Knorr-Cetina, integrated constructivist views of science-as-practice into a “performance” model of society, according to which society is “something achieved in practice by all actors,” scientific as well as social.​[76]​ Foucault, in turn, pursued a third way which, instead of identifying knowledge with power or delineating the social determination of science, “articulated” discursive practices on nondiscursive practices.​[77]​ Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer blended these models of science and society in their influential accounts of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural philosophy, according to which science sustained itself by “cultivating,” rather then constructing or representing, social interests.​[78]​ These interpretive strategies had a significant influence on social historians of the Chemical Revolution.

	The nominalist tendencies of postmodernism encouraged historians of science to emphasize the “specificity” of eighteenth-century natural philosophy and the fragmented nature of the Enlightenment and the Chemical Revolution. Drawing on deconstructionist and Foucauldian notions of discourse and its practices, Wilda Anderson and Jan Golinski analyzed the role of rhetorical and discursive devices in the simultaneous production of knowledge and the community of knowers in the Chemical Revolution.​[79]​ Viewed in these terms, the texts of the Chemical Revolution did not represent preexisting truths or meaning so much as marshal resources to recruit, persuade, and control their readers. In  a similar vein, Bernadette Bensuade-Vinncent, Lissa Roberts, and Simon Schaffer showed how the instruments of the Chemical Revolution – Lavoisier’s balance and calorimeter and Priestley’s eudiometer – not only measured nature, but also disciplined a community of users and mediated with the wider culture. Like Christie and Golinski, these and other commentators focused on the nature and identity of chemical practices in the eighteenth century. Postmodernism shaped a variety of historiographical strategies designed to contextualize the Chemical Revolution by focusing on the rhetorical forms and discursive functions of its texts and instruments in relation to the social and institutional contexts in which they were deployed. 

CONCLUSION: BEYOND MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM.

	As Bruno Latour noted, “history did not really count” for the moderns and postmoderns.​[80]​ Instead of grasping the Chemical Revolution as a product of history, a specific mode of temporality, modernist and postmodernist historians of chemistry viewed it as a scientific discovery, a moment of rationality, or a matrix of practices and interests that happened to have occurred in the past. They subsumed history under the disciplinary interests and categories of science, philosophy, or sociology, and they failed to develop an adequate account of the moments of continuity and discontinuity in scientific change. While positivist and postpositivist historians encompassed scientific change within an overarching identity, or series of identities, postmodernist historians lost sight of the pattern of historical change in a bewildering array of local actors and specific situations. If postpositivist historians transformed the rising curve of historical development, envisioned by the positivist historiography, into an horizontal series of discrete and immobile line-segments, postmodernist historians shattered it into ‘a thousand points of light,’ each moving according to its own devices. But the dispersing thrust of postmodernism did not move beyond the modernist framework of progressive development, merely using anachronistic references to confuse and shock the “‘modernist’ avant-gardes.” Modernist temporality, with its image of history as “an ordered front of entities sharing the same contemporary time,” could not do justice to the dynamic autonomy and irreducibility of historical events, “which pertain to all sorts of times and possess all sorts of ontological statuses.”​[81]​ An adequate account of scientific and historical change requires a just recognition of the complexity of historical events and the temporality that informs them. 
	
	In the 1960s and 1970s, Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault used the notion of complexity to characterize the specificity and autonomy of history.​[82]​ While they opposed the essentialist and historicists view of the unity, linearity, and homogeneity of a single, absolute historical time, they also rejected the pluralistic orientation of the Annales authors, who affirmed “the existence of different temporal strata and rhythms – the political, the economic, the geographical – without attempting to establish any systematic link between them.”​[83]​ Accordingly, Althusser viewed a social formation as a “decentered totality,” in which each instance, level, or practice possesses its own autonomy and causal efficacy within a system of causal efficacies. This system does not determine the content or mode of temporality of its levels, but their “locus of effectivity,” their complex relations of cause and effect, dominance and subordination, order and arrangement. Like the postmoderns, the Althusserean historian recognizes that an historical assembly is not “an ordered front of entities.” But whereas the postmoderns constructed collages of explicitly anachronistic and contemporary entities, the job of the historian is to portray “polytemporal” assemblies of diverse modes of temporality - the new, old, progressive, regressive, cyclical, or stagnant – no one of which is more outdated or contemporary than any other one. The past is never truly finished, and the historian is enjoined to develop a balanced sense of the specificity, relative autonomy, and dynamic interrelatedness of the diverse modes of temporality that make up an historical assembly in which the living past is an integral part of the present.​[84]​

	Larry Holmes drew attention to the complexity of historical events when he criticized existing accounts of the Chemical Revolution because they failed to do justice to “the complexity of the event.”​[85]​ Instead of focusing on a “group of subproblems,” such as the discovery of oxygen, the reform of the nomenclature, or the discursive deployment of the balance as the “defining thread” of the Chemical Revolution, Holmes showed how “the various thematic strands that historians have isolated as crucial factors were interwoven” in the dynamic unfolding of Lavoisier’s career. Insisting that the Chemical Revolution was a “complex multidimensional episode,” an unfolding network of theoretical, experimental, discursive, institutional, cultural, and social strands, he called for the integration of “scholarly essays that highlight specific topics” into “a story that must someday be told on a grander scale.”​[86]​ 
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